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Abstract: This paper presents an agent-based model of a land market (ALMA-C) to simulate
the emergence of land prices and urban land patterns from bottom-up. Our model mimics
individual decisions to buy and to sell land depending on economic, sociological and political
factors as well as on the characteristics of the spatial environment. To this we add ecological
and environmental considerations and focus on the question of how individual land use
decisions can be affected to reduce the pressure on the coastal zone ecosystem functions. A
series of model experiments helps visualize and explore how economic incentives at a land
market can influence the spatial distribution of activities and land prices in a coastal zone. We
demonstrate that economic incentives do affect urban form and pattern, land prices and welfare
measures. However, they may not always be sufficient to reduce the pressure on coastal zone
ecosystems.
Keywords: agent-based modelling; coastal zone ecosystems; land market mechanisms.

1. INTRODUCTION
Coastal zones (CZ) are important from both ecological and socio-economic points of view
(Martínez, Intralawan et al. 2007). These are one of the most productive areas on our planet that
provide many ecosystem services such as erosion control and sediment retention, habitat for
species, food production, recreation and others (Costanza, d’Arge et al. 1997). Like other
ecotones these areas are especially rich in biodiversity and have one of the highest values for
ecosystem services per hectare of area. CZs require a delicate balance between humandominated systems and ecosystem functions provided by interactions of land and sea. This
makes protection of CZs in their pristine form an important component of environmental
management. Unfortunately, CZs are also very lucrative area for development. CZs are also one
of the most densely populated areas housing two thirds of world’s population (Costanza,
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Andrade et al. 1999). Particularly in the Netherlands 70% of the Gross National Product today
is generated in the CZ (Veraart, Brinkman et al. 2007). Pressure on CZ induced by economic
activities causes the disruption of coastal ecosystem functions including modification of a
shoreline, reduction of habitat’s carrying capacity and diminishing recreational value of coasts
(Costanza, Andrade et al. 1999; Martínez, Intralawan et al. 2007). Waterfront properties are
known to be several times more expensive than similar properties inland. People are willing to
pay high prices for water view and water access. These areas have been also historically
developed due to proximity to marine and river transportation. Further developments occur in
the proximity to historic cities causing even more buildings constructed in areas vulnerable to
flood or erosion. According to IPCC the damage from natural disasters has rapidly increased
over the past decades due to the growth of capital in flood-prone areas (Nicholls, Wong et al.
2007). Thus, in addition to contributing to the deterioration of coastal ecosystem functions
economic activities located in CZ are subject to flood risks. The potential damage from
flooding/erosion depends on the economic value of land and concentration of economic
activities or residential areas.
If we are to protect CZ ecosystem services we need to find ways to create disincentives for
people allocation near the coastline. Using economic incentives to achieve environmental goals
can be much more efficient than traditional command and control regulation, if the incentives
can be put in place and enforced at relatively low cost (Costanza, Andrade et al. 1999). What
can be the economic incentives and market mechanisms that would reallocate population out of
the CZs?
In this paper we present a simple agent-based model that integrates heterogeneous landscape,
explicit individual location choices via land market to explore the influence of economic
incentives on the aggregated spatial pattern of the urban area. Since the area occupied by urban
developments actually takes over the land that provides ecosystem functions in CZ, this
aggregated pattern indirectly shows how much pressure is put on the CZ ecosystems.
2. THE MODEL
Our Agent-based Land MArket for Coast model (ALMA-C) simulates the emergence of urban
land patterns and land prices as a result of micro-scale interactions between buyers and sellers
of land with application to a coastal city. The main agents in the model are traders, spatial
goods (i.e. land lots) and a market (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. UML class diagram of the ALMA metamodel
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The core of the model is presented by a land market (Filatova, Parker et al. 2007; Filatova,
Parker et al. under submission). ALMA-C borrows much from the analytical monocentric urban
model (Alonso 1964) and its application to a city with green amenities (Wu and Plantinga
2003). In line with the assumptions of the analytical model the ALMA-C model assumes that
each spatial good is differentiated by distance (D) from the central business district (CBD) (or
its inverse measure – proximity P=Dmax+1-D) and level of environmental amenities (A)
(estimated as a normalized distance to the coast). Other attributes of land can be easily added if
needed. Buyers (i.e., households) search for a location that maximizes their utility
U = Aα ⋅ P β (ά and β are individual preferences for green amenities and proximity
correspondingly) and is affordable to their disposable budget for housing net of transport costs
(Y). The rationality of agents is bounded by the fact that they do not search for the maximum
throughout the whole landscape but rather search for the local maximum among N randomly
chosen cells. We impose this assumption since the search for a house in reality is very costly
(time-wise and money-wise), meaning that a global optimum is not likely to be located in realworld housing markets. After defining the spatial good that gives maximum utility a buyer
forms the bid price. A bid price is a function of utility (U), individual income (Y) and prices of
n
all other goods (influence of which is expressed by a constant b): Pbid = Y ⋅ U . The
n
b +U n
justification and properties of this demand function are discussed in details in (Filatova, Parker
et al. under submission). Sellers form their bid prices also depending on their utility, bit their
ask price do not go below the price of an open space area (Pnat).
Having found the optimal
location, buyers submit their
offer-bids to the sellers. Sellers
choose the highest bid-offer and
if it is above their ask price,
then the transactions take place.
If not then both buyer and seller
participate in the land market in
the next times step. The final
transaction price is an arithmetic
average of the ask price and the
highest bid price. Figure 2
shows the logic of the trading
mechanism, i.e. one time step in
the model (more about event
sequencing in (Filatova, Parker
et al. under submission)).
Let us suppose that in attempt to
protect the coastal ecosystem
services we are introducing a
Figure 2. Conceptual algorithm of trade
tax to make coastal properties
more expensive and less affordable. Suppose we calculate the amount of tax to be paid as
T = tr ⋅ Pnat ⋅ Pamen , where tr is a tax rate in % and Pamen is proximity to the coast.

3. SIMULATION EXPERIMENTS
Running the model we can produce spatially explicit land price gradients and land patterns as
simulation results. We are mainly interested in how the introduction of a land tax, aimed to
protect CZ ecosystems, affects economic indicators and the spatial morphology of the city. In
addition to graphical representations, we also present a set of metrics to analyze micro and
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macro economic and spatial outcomes (listed in Table 1 below). Our major metric of success
with respect to the ecosystem services preservation is the number of undeveloped cells within
the prime coastal zone, which is defined as the stripe of land covered by 7 cells wide along the
coast (all the zone that lies to the left of the CBD). We will call this zone CZ buffer.
All model experiments presented in this paper were performed on a 31x51 grid of cells with
part of the landscape (5x cells) representing sea and a coastline. The CBD was set at the cell
with coordinates (-4;0). There were 2652 buyers and sellers participating at the land market.
The price of the natural area (Pnat) was set equal to 200. We run the model with agents having
homogenous preferences for green amenities, i.e. for the view on the coastline, ά = 0.7.
Although the code of the ALMA-C model allows simulation of a land market with
heterogeneous agents, we did not use this possibility here to keep clarity. Transport costs per
unit of distance were equal to 20 units, the constant b in (1) was equal to 70.
To understand the influence of such an economic incentive as tax on the aggregated outcomes
we ran a series of 13 experiments. We changed only two parameters in the experiments: tax rate
and individual income, which both affect households’ willingness to pay for the house in the
coastal city. Each experiment is associated with the value of tax and income, specifically
experiment “3-900” means that we ran the model with a land tax equal to 3% and individual
income equal to 900 units. We show the outcomes of 7 representative experiments in Table 1
and discuss the results of the others below.
Table 1. Economic and spatial metric outcomes of the ALMA-C experiments
Parameter
Individual utility:
Mean
St. dev.
Aggregate utility
Urban transaction
price:
Mean
St. dev.
Total
property
value
City size (urban
population)
Undeveloped land
in CZ buffer
Distance at which
city border stops

0-800

5-800

5- ND
800/20

0-900

5-900

0-1000

5-1000

73.17

71.86

72.68

70.26

70.59

67.79

68.15

11.13
36587.71

10.82
28672.4

11.41
34305.6

12.14
43494

12.18
40450.55

12.98
49082.77

12.87
48254.45

312.67

312.07

318.64

336.61

337.12

361.77

358.07

75.84

73.92

79.49

93.15

90.61

110.15

107.86

193169.9

261924.4

253515.4

156335.9

124514.1 147965.8 208363.2

500

399

472

619

573

724

708

86

175

117

42

74

6

12

20.88

18.11

19.23

23.77

22.36

25.71

25.7
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We begin with the experiment that replicates the monocentric urban model with amenities such
as coastline. The main difference between the simulation experiment and the analytical model is
that the centralized equilibrium land price determination mechanism is replaced by a series of
bilateral trades distributed in space and time. Individual households endowed with income equal
to 800 try to buy a house that maximises their utility in the coastal city. There is no tax for land
introduced in this city. The urban land price gradient is presented in Figure 3 and quantitative
measures can be found in Table 1, column “0-800”. The intensity of grey colour symbolizes the
value of land: the darker the colour, the higher the land
price. The urban land prices are the highest in the CBD.
As in the benchmark case of a theoretical monocentric
urban model, the land price gradient is decreasing with
distance from the CBD. But because of the presence of
the coast, which serves as an attractor for the
households and increases value of the land, urban land
laying to the left of the CBD has higher prices than the
area to the right. The city expansion stops at the location
when bid price of a buyer falls below the price of open
space. The white area in Figure 3 shows the beginning
of open space and symbolizes the city border.

Figure 3. Land price gradients
(households income = 800, no tax for
land introduced). Red counter shows
the CBD.

With the increase of individual income the city
significantly expands and CZ buffer representing the
amount of open space along the coastline decreases
(compare experiments “0-800”, “0-900” and “0-1000”
in Table 1). So does an average individual utility from
location showing that people enjoy less densely
populated city, which provides more open space along
the coast and less commuting in terms of time and
money. In spite of decrease in average utility land prices
still grow because the purchasing capacity, i.e. income,
has increased.

We proceed with demonstration of changes in the
location behaviour of households changes if an
environmental tax on land is introduced. The idea is that
now agents have to pay extra money for location closer
to the coast, assuming all other factors are the same. If
this happens then demand for these locations goes
down, since it becomes harder to find buyers that could
afford to buy there. The market mechanisms start to
work. Since our model is not only demand-driven,
meaning that land prices are determined via bilateral
trades with sellers, the bid price that buyers offer is
below the ask price (which also depends on the spatial
characteristics of the land lot, but it could not be lower
than the land price of the natural area). In this case the
transaction simply does not occur and land lot is not
occupied by an urban land use.
Let us set the tax equal to 5% of the land price of the
natural area. The land price gradient is presented in
Figure 4. First of all, the spatial form of the city has
changed. The area closer to the coast became less
attractive for households to pay more to cover the
threshold of the Pnat. The households in this experiment
basically “voted with their feet” in favour of living in
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Figure 4. Land price gradients
(households income = 800, and land
tax = 5%). Red counter shows the
CBD.
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another town because living on the coast now bears additional costs. As a result a lot of land in
the “primary” CZ was left unsold and remained in natural conditions. A positive sign is that the
CZ buffer has significantly expanded: it became 103% larger than in the city without the land
tax aimed to preserve CZ (compare columns “0-800” and “5-800” in Table 1).
The results of experiment “5-800” indicates that in the absence of real markets for the
environmental services provided by the CZ economic incentives, such as taxes imposed by the
government, may help to influence the land market to achieve more environmentally friendly
land use patterns. However, the outcome can change quite dramatically if we open up the
market and raise the limit on individual budgets. Effectively this means that we are inviting
buyers that are more affluent to come from elsewhere and enter the market.
We repeat the second experiment but assuming that richer households enter this urban land
market (we set tax equal to 5% and incomes equal to 1000 units). The results are presented in
Table 1 (see “5-1000”) and in Figure 5. Thus, in the
presence of more affluent households the city not only
expands over the borders of the city in the experiment
“5-800” (Figure 4) but overflows the boundaries of the
city without land tax (experiment “0-800”, Figure 3).
High-income agents can afford to pay additional costs
in terms of the land tax and, thus, settle along the
coastline. This fact can often be observed in reality: the
wealthiest individuals buy houses with a view on the
coast. As a result the CZ buffer has shrunk to 93% of
what it was when agents’ income was 800 (see “5800”).
On the other hand, in reality not all people have equally
high incomes. There is a certain distribution of incomes
in the city. Figure 6 shows the land price gradients in
the case when we run the model for the population of
agents with heterogeneous incomes and land tax rate of
5%. Individual incomes follows normal distribution
Figure 5. Land price gradients
with mean 800 and standard deviation of 20 (see
(households income = 1000, and land
experiment 5-ND 800/20 in Table 1). There are some
tax = 5%). Red counter shows the
households with income higher than average of 800 (as
CBD.
in experiment “5-800” and “0-800”), which can afford
to buy houses in the CZ buffer and pay a land tax. However, market incentives still work and
part of CZ buffer became vacant (117 instead of 86 in the case without land tax).
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In fact, the last three experiments (“5-800”, “5-1000”
and “5-ND 800/20”) showed that economic incentives
work only if agents have fixed income. If taxes are
introduced but the higher-income households enter the
land market then the effect of the tax introduction is
eliminated. The introduction of the tax and increase in
household incomes drive spatial and land price
dynamics in opposite directions. In this case we were
interested to investigate the relationship between these
two factors. We performed a series of additional
experiments with tax rates changing from 0% to 7% and
income changing from 800 to 1000. The results in terms
of the CZ buffer area remained undeveloped are
presented in Table 2.
Table 2. Number of undeveloped cells in the CZ buffer
under different tax rates and income values
Tax rate
0%
3%
5%
7%

800

Individual income
900
1000

86
92
175
314

42
46
74
247

Figure 6. Land price gradients

6
10
12
158

(households incomes follow normal
ditribution and land tax = 5%). Red
counter shows the CBD.

Visually the relationship is presented in Figure 7. One can see that in the zone of high income
the increase in tax gives very small effect on the CZ buffer
4. DISCUSSION AND
CONCLUSIONS
The paper aims at
exploring the effects of
economic incentives on
CZ ecosystem services.
At this stage we are
interested in general
qualitative trends of the
ecological – economic
system.
We
used
artificial data for both
the agents’ behaviour
and
the
spatial
environment. However,
the structural validation
Figure 7. The percentage of CZ buffer not occupied by urban land
of the model was
use
performed (Filatova et
al. 2007). The main
difficulty of applying ABMs to the real world cases and model validation is in acquiring data
about people’s preferences and perceptions. As a part of a more general survey on risk of flood
perception carried out in March 2008, we created a questionnaire about individual preferences
for locations, including preferences for coastal environmental amenities and individual risk
perceptions. As the next stage of model development we plan to integrate survey data (when
statistical analysis is available) into the agents’ behaviour in our ABM.
The model has shown that economic incentives may help in managing the urban development
in CZ but may not necessarily produce the desired outcome. For example, the environmental
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tax instead of protecting the CZ by driving population away from the coast results in attracting
more affluent residents – something clearly observed in reality. The CZ becomes populated by
MacMansions, which still may have a positive effect on the environment assuring less
residential density. The problem then is that environmental quality can potentially lead to
social injustice and unrest. The environmental tax drives people away from their native habitats,
which then get developed and shaped for the more affluent residents. The ABM helps quantify
some of these impacts and analyze trends and spatial patterns as emerging outcomes of
individuals interacting at the land market.
Different residential patterns may occur if we bring risk perception into consideration. While
CZs and waterfront are attractive residential factors, they become also associated with higher
risks of natural disaster (hurricanes, floods, etc.). These are likely to be more frequent with
global warming and climate change. As a result, chances are that in addition to environmental
taxes, insurance policies are likely to kick in, when insurance companies will deny insurance
for properties located too close to the coast. In this case risk perception may become another
major component in addition to affluence that will govern the patterns of allocation for
residents. Incorporating these processes into our model is the next step in our research.
With a lack of markets for ecosystem services there should be other indirect economic
mechanisms for CZ management, which would help account for these services in the decision
making process. Developing tools for visualization and scenario analysis, such as the ALMA-C
model, is an important prerequisite of environmentally sound land use planning.
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